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role in the ongoing 2007-2009 credit crisis. Starting in August 2007, a large amount
of initially AAA rated CDO securities are substantially downgraded, some directly
to junk grade. This paper explores two structural sources of CDO mispricing:
modeling difficulty and data limitation. Simulating the frailty correlated default
model of Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2008), we show that CDO mis-pricing
can be partly attributed to model misspecifications, as well as limited availability
of historical data on CDO collateral assets. This simulation result is consistent
with empirical evidence on historical performance of a sample of 279 CDOs. The
frailty model estimated with adequate historical data would have reduced the
amount of AAA rated CDO securities by 12% on average. The frailty model has
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I. Introduction
The ongoing 2007-2009 credit crisis has unprecedented impact on the financial industry.1
At the center of this crisis is the previously little known financial innovation called collat-
eralized debt obligations (CDOs). CDOs are debt claims with various seniorities against
collateral asset pools. Senior claimholders will not suffer loss until the subordinated
tranches are exhausted. Due to such prioritized structure and other credit enhancement
such as insurance, most CDO senior tranches had AAA credit rating prior to the credit
crisis. CDO issuance started in 1987 but remained dormant till 1997 (issuance $17
billion), since then the market grew rapidly to reach annual issuance of $520.6 billion
in 2006, according to Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
CDO issuance peaked in 2007Q2 ($178.6 billion) and afterwards declined exponentially
(2009Q1 issuance $0.8 billion). Prior understanding about CDO valuation turned out to
be spurious as evidenced by overwhelming write-downs.2 This study examines potential
structural causes of CDO mispricing.
The innovative nature of CDOs makes it difficult to pin down the exact reasons
for this valuation failure. On one hand, given the short history of the product and
modeling difficulties, Duffie (2007) doubts the capability for anyone to evaluate CDOs
with comfortable accuracy. On the other hand, regulators and media have rushed to
cry fouls to CDO underwriters and credit rating agencies, who brought CDOs to the
marketplace. While some market participants likely deserve more blames than others,
“careful research is needed to distinguish the relative importance of the bad incentives
view and the mispricing view” as these two views have distinctly different implications
for regulation and risk management going forward (Allen (2008)).
Given the limitations in modeling techniques and historical data, large losses do
not automatically imply risk management failures (Stulz (2008)). This argument is
particularly relevant for the current setting of CDOs which are collateralized on pool of
1Among the top five Wall Street investment banks, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on
September 15, 2008, Bear Stearns was acquired by J. P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, Merrill Lynch
was acquired by Bank of America on September 14, 2008, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley con-
verted into bank holding companies on September 21, 2008.
2For instance, on July 28, 2008, Merrill Lynch sold $30.6 billion in notional value U.S. super senior
ABS CDOs to an affiliate of Dallas, Texas based private equity firm Lone Star Funds for $6.7 billion,
or 22 cents on a dollar. (Merrill Lynch also financed 75% of the sale through a loan with recourse only
on those CDOs.)
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default-risky assets. Accurate valuation of CDOs requires modeling the joint distribution
of those assets, especially the default correlation. Defaults are rare events. Hence, default
correlation is hard to measure. Furthermore, even single-obligor credit risk analysis
proves to be difficult. There is little consensus on the best practices on portfolio credit
risk modeling. In this paper, we examine the impact of data limitation and model
specification on portfolio credit risk evaluation and CDO mispricing.3
Traditional portfolio credit risk models such as Vasicek (1987) assume that default
correlation is driven only by observable common factors. However, recent studies show
that such approach significantly under-estimate the actual default correlation (Das,
Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007), Christoffersen, Ericsson, Jacobs, and Jin (2009)).
Based on this observation, Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita (DEHS, 2008) propose a
frailty correlated default model, in which the latent “frailty” factor is unobservable and
time-varying. The frailty approach is popular for modeling mortality rates in acturial
science (see, e.g., Wang and Brown (1998)). Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2008) show
that their model performs well in matching historical default patterns.
We first show, via simulations, that the DEHS frailty model provides a good esti-
mation approach. We obtain convergence of the maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters determining the default intensity process. Furthermore, the frailty factor
time series can be successfully filtered out through Bayesian analysis. The filtered con-
ditional posterior joint distribution of the dynamic frailty factor has a mean path highly
correlated with the hypothetic “true” path. After validating the DEHS model, we con-
duct more simulations to examine the effects of model specification and data history on
portfolio credit risk analysis. We focus on the tail risk that is most relevant to CDO
senior tranches often rated AAA.
Our simulation results on model specification substantiate the importance of frailty
factor to portfolio credit risk valuation. At AAA level, expected portfolio default loss
rate is 5.4% higher with frailty consideration than without frailty. Hence, ignoring frailty
factor would result in 5.4% extra AAA tranche size. Moral hazard caused by implicit
government support has been proposed as a possible cause of excessive risk-taking by
financial institutions. For example, when the market drops, the Federal Reserve may cut
interest rate to alleviate financing costs and boost market sentiment. This phenomenon
3The issues on conflicts of interest and CDO security design are discussed by Griffin and Tang (2008),
Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008).
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is most prominent during Allan Greenspan’s tenure and coined as “Greenspan Put”.
However, our simulation result shows that such consideration of “Greenspan Put” has
little effect on portfolio credit risk valuation when frailty factor is present. Lastly, rapid
growth of credit derivatives market may be accompanied by potential structural breaks in
default modeling. We find modest effect of such consideration jointly with frailty factor.
When structural break exists in the data generating process, portfolio default loss rate
is underestimated by 2.4% when we assume that there is no break in the historical data
for the model estimation.
CDO market has short history and data could be a concern for back testing. Ad-
ditionally, data quality can be problematic due to misrepresentation of collateral infor-
mation (e.g., Keys et al (2008)). It is difficult to evaluate the impact of data limitation
using real data for obvious reasons. Simulation analysis is our preferred approach. We
find that more data may not always be desirable as the estimation results are state de-
pendent. While the non-monotonicity of data length effect is to be further researched,
it is comforting to see that the estimation approach is robust to data noise.
Having examined potential impacts of model and data on CDO valuation, we apply
the DEHS frailty model to historical CDO data. Our sample contains 279 CDOs issued
between October 1997 and December 2004. There are 65 collateralized bond obliga-
tions (CBOs), 94 collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), 103 CDOs collateralized with
asset-backed securities (ABS CDOs) including most mortgage-back securities, 17 CDOs
collateralized with other CDO tranche securities (CDO2s).
Our empirical findings are consistent with the simulation results. The no-frailty
model generates lower portfolio default rates and hence higher AAA tranche sizes than
a credit rating agency result. The no frailty model underestimates default rates by
7% on average. However, the frailty factor increases the portfolio default rate at AAA
level by 19%. Therefore, accounting for frailty factor the AAA rated CDO tranches
could shrink by 12%. If the frailty model is indeed useful, we would observe subsequent
downgrades of CDO AAA tranches when the frailty model indicates higher risk than
rating agency model. As of the rating data available date December 2008, most CDO
rating changes at AAA level occurred to ABS CDOs. We find in the ABS CDO group,
that the frailty model has 21% extra predictive power for future downgrades. About
80% of ABS CDO AAA rated tranches with high risk according to frailty model are
subsequently downgraded, in contrast to 0% for low risk group.
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We make three contributions to the literature. First, we shed light on the potential
structural causes of CDO mispricing. We show that model specification and data limi-
tation can have substantial effects on CDO valuation. Our empirical evidence supports
the simulation results. Second, although model uncertainty is well studied in equity
markets and portfolio allocation (e.g., Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2007)), we take it to
the credit derivatives market and present its strong impact. Model inaccuracy is proba-
bly one of the biggest factors for the CDO valuation failure. Third, our study provides
a good framework for analyzing financial innovations, which will likely continue and the
same model and data issues would appear repeatedly. Therefore, our research provides
preliminary direction for future risk management practice.
Our study is built upon Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2008). We add to existing
studies in the following ways. While Longstaff and Rajan (2008) argue that histori-
cal CDO prices are well explained, Brennan, Hein, and Poon (2008) and Coval, Jurek,
and Stafford (2008) show that substantial mispricing can arise in the CDO structuring
process. Our finding of systematic mispricing due to limitation in historical data and
model misspecification provides a justification for the above seemingly conflicting find-
ings. Fender, Tarashev, and Zhu (2008) also show that CDO can be overvalued relative
to equivalent corporate bonds. Eckner (2008), Feldhtter (2008) and Heitfield (2008) use
MCMC for CDO pricing. Our study differs by the economic motivation. Finally, our
paper makes similar points to the discussion by Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the setting of our
study and relevant literature. Section III describes the frailty correlated default model
and our simulation method. Our simulation results on the effects of model specification,
data history and their interaction are discussed in Sections IV. Empirical analysis using
historical CDO data is provided in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CDO Primer and Literature Review
The prototype of a CDO originates in 1987 at junk bond powerhouse Drexel Burnham
Lambert (bankrupt in February 1990). The resurgence in current format is mostly at-
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tributed to Credit Suisse First Boston in 1997 (notably Christopher Ricciardi).4 The
CDO market experienced explosive growth in recent years before its collapse in 2008.
CDOs are investment conduits holding credit securities as collateral assets and issuing
secured notes as liabilities with prioritized payment structure. They belong to the cate-
gory of pay-through asset-backed securities (ABS).5 Major collateral asset types include
corporate loans and bonds but other types include credit card debt and credit derivative
contracts. Most CDOs have multiple tranches where parts of the tranches are sold to
different investors. However, single-tranche CDOs (“bespoke” CDOs) are often struc-
tured specifically for a particular investor need. Except static deals, CDO assets are
administered by collateral managers. CDO operations are overseen by trustees.
A. CDO Structuring, Rating, and Pricing
CDOs serve the economic purpose of balancing the supply and demand of credit market.
Investment banks underwrite CDOs, like IPOs and SEOs, mostly in the format of full
commitment. The underwriters often provide bridge loans to purchase and warehouses
to store collateral assets before deal closing. Underwriters also often provide liquidity
facilities (such as revolving loans, swaps, and put options) for the CDO. CDOs can be
initiated by collateral asset originator, manager, or underwriter. The liability structure
of the CDO is mostly determined by the underwriter (with agreement of the manager)
according to investor demand and rating requirement.
CDO market has been a rated market from the beginning. With the estimated
distribution of expected portfolio default loss,6 the tranche must withstand the scenario
default rate (SDR) of the desired rating. SDR is the portfolio default rate (with some
adjustment based on default experience) for which the default probability exceeding this
portfolio default rate is no greater than that of historical corporate bond default rate
with the same rating. In practice, many investors rely on the ratings for CDO pricing.
4The development of the credit derivatives market in general is largely attributed to J. P. Morgan
(notably Blythe Masters), which invented credit default swaps (CDS) that fueled the synthetic CDO
market.
5CDOs are distinguishable from traditional ABS in two aspects. First, CDO structure and collateral
assets are much more diverse than traditional ABS. Second, CDO liability structure is more complex
with trigger events to retire the senior tranches and other credit enhancements.
6CDOs are constructed from underlying portfolio characterized by collateral credit quality, maturity
and correlation. The cash flows are tranched into different classes. The credit quality of each class
depends on the recovery rate as well as credit enhancements. The valuation of CDO, therefore, starts
with and depends heavily on the accurate assessment of the credit risk of the collateral portfolio.
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All three major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch) employ simulation meth-
ods when rating CDOs. Two different approaches are often used to derive credit portfolio
value from individual collateral assets. The structural approach (e.g., “copula” approach,
used especially by S&P) assumes asset value processes are correlated, and a firm defaults
when its asset value falls below some default threshold. Asset value is simulated with
imposed correlations. Credit portfolio value is determined after all assets are simulated.
Repeating the simulation multiple times results in a distribution of the portfolio value.
Reduced form approach assumes default occurs suddenly and unpredictable. Default
intensity can be linked to firm-specific and market-wide variables. The number of de-
faults in the collateral portfolio follows a given distribution (e.g., Binomial as used by
Moody’s diversity score system). Portfolio loss rate is drawn repeatedly from this default
distribution. After obtaining the distribution of portfolio loss rate, different scenarios
are defined referring to different ratings through “idealized default probability” concept.
Those scenario default rates are key to obtaining desired ratings for the CDO tranches.
The purchase price for CDO notes are mostly at par. The coupon rate on each
tranche is the most visible pricing indicator. However, coupon rate, rating and tranche
size are jointly determined. The credit spread of a given rating is easily agreeable.
Hence, the most critical pricing component is tranche size (equivalently the risk level of
the tranche). We focus on tranche size throughout the paper and use rating, pricing,
and valuation interchangeably.
B. Portfolio Credit Risk and CDO Valuation
Credit risk portfolio valuation is difficult due to non-normal distributions. The simula-
tion approach used in practice is often criticized for oversimplification and lack of eco-
nomic intuition. Closed-form solutions can only be obtained under strong assumptions
such as the Vasicek (1987) model, which is based on Merton (1974) distance-to-default
(DD) model applied to correlated collateral assets. Merton DD model regards equity
value as a call option on the firm’s underlying assets with a strike price set at the face
value of debt. The firm’s asset value and asset volatility are inferred from the equity
value following an iterative procedure. Then Default Probability is calculated as the
normal cumulative distribution function of a Z-score depending on the above variables.
However, the tractability and accuracy of the Merton DD model are tightly restricted
by the underlying strong assumptions.
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One recent successful extension of the Merton model to CDO valuation is Coval,
Jurek, and Stafford (2008). Conditioning on the realization of market return, a factor
structure is added to Merton (1974) model. Firm asset values are exposed to a common
market factor, which introduces the default correlation. Different from other one factor
models (Vasicek(1987) etc.), no restriction is imposed to the common factor distribution.
Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) compare the structural models for corporate bonds
spread from the empirical perspective. While the implied bond spreads from the Merton
model tend to underestimate the spreads realized in the market, other structural models,
however, seem to on average suffer from the overestimation problem. Moreover, although
most structural models generally overestimate especially for the high leveraged firms,
they are even more likely to underestimate the relatively safety bonds at the same time.
Andreou and Ghysels (2008) emphasize the effect of structural shifts to the credit risk
structural model. Instead of fixing the structural model parameter at some points, they
point out that it is necessary to take into account the structural parameter variation.
Failing to incorporate this effect may result in biased inferences. An optimal sequential
quality control procedural with minimum detecting time for monitoring the structural
breaks is suggested, which is extremely useful for monitoring the corporation stability
during financial distress. Moreover, with a good finite sample behavior as indicated in
their simulation, the suggested procedure could be used for the quality control of the
credit models.
Alternative to structural models is the so-called reduced form models, which are
widely used in assessing portfolio risk as well, e.g., Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007). The
main difference between these two approach are the nature of the event that triggers
default and the model fitting. While the structural models identify default when distance
to default falls below certain barrier, Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007)’s model assumes
that defaults occur randomly with a probability determined by firm specific distance to
default, trailing stock return and macroeconomic variables including interest rates and
market-wide stock returns. As many as the choices are, model uncertainty problem is
widely accepted. This uncertainty problem undoubtedly will affect the CDO valuation
accuracy.
Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2008) show that CDO senior tranche is inaccurately
priced, and senior tranche investors should have required higher risk premium than
that indicated by the “unreliable” ratings. The mis-prcing comes from the economic
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catastrophe feature of CDO and many other structured products which default only
under extreme bad economic states. This default clustering feature in bad economic
states acts as an extra source of risk for senior CDO tranches. Rating agencies, however,
ignore this economic catastrophe feature in practice. Investors therefore should not rely
on credit ratings for CDO pricing or risk assessing, for the information contained is in-
sufficient. To correct the CDO pricing failure, Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2008) develop
a state contingent framework based on a modified Merton’s (1974) structural model.
Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) provide a detailed discussion of the structured
products market and the valuation/rating failure. Additional to the economic catas-
trophe feature as discussed in Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2008), they claim that small
model error can be significantly magnified by the pooling and tranching structure of
structured products. The model error could be either inaccurate assumption for the
default correlations or default probability of collateral assets. The largest impact can be
found in the more complicated CDO2.
CDO mispricing may also be related to local thinking as addressed by Gennaiolio and
Shleifer (2008). Using a nearly Bayesian Model of decision making, they suggest that
decision makers are likely to be misled and make mistake when evaluating the proba-
bility based on the representativeness. Generally, the representativeness consists of the
more frequent and common evens, and moderate mistake is witnessed for the probability
estimation. When there is a mismatch between the representative and frequency, how-
ever, the probabilities of the hypothesis with the rare event as representativeness tend
to be severely underestimated by a local thinker with limited memory. Hence, CDO
credit risk, with infrequent representativeness, might be severely underestimated by a
local thinker.
C. Default Correlation and Frailty Factor
Although agency conflicts may arise during the security design (Mehran and Stulz (2007),
SEC (2008)), structured finance instruments, CDOs in particular, can be useful invest-
ment tools as long as the default correlation is low, as shown by DeMarzo (2005) and
Leland (2007). However, default correlation is hard to measure and this part contributed
mostly to the failure of CDO valuation (Brunnermeier (2009), BIS (2008), Crouhy, Jar-
row, and Turnbull (2008), Hull (2008), Plosser (2009), S&P (2007)). For such low oc-
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currence events, Bayesian approach is particularly appealing (Kiefer (2009), McNeil and
Wendin (2007), Glasserman and Li (2005), Loﬄer (2003)). Therefore, when assessing
credit risk of structured finance instruments such as CDOs, it is necessary to consider
both the firm specific default predictors, and more challengingly, the default correlation.
A conventional portfolio loss risk model assumes that default correlation comes only
from the observable factors. Even with the benefits of various firm-specific and macroe-
conomic covariates, however, Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) finds empirical
evidence that defaults are more clustered than suggested by conventional models based
merely on observable factors. Bonfim (2009), Koopman, Kraussl, Lucas, and Monteiro
(2009), Jimenez and Mencia (2009), Berd, Engle, and Voronov (2007) all stress the
importance of not only the observable factors, but also the unobservable factors which
generate extra correlation. Model uncertainty is discussed by Cont (2006) and Rajna
(2000). DEHS (2008) provides a new model for corporate default intensity with a time
varying common latent factor, and in the presence of a firm specific unobservable co-
variate. They find that the prediction power of a general credit model will be increased
dramatically by incorporating an common unobservable covariate. Compared with the
traditional method, this model is especially good for the default clustering estimation.
However, this refined pricing model still suffers from parameter uncertainty. Limited
data history further deteriorates the estimation accuracy. While Bayesian approach is
employed to solve the parameter uncertainty, no research has been done for the effect of
limited data history.
In the spirit of DEHS (2008), we use dynamic frailty model as the benchmark model
for portfolio loss estimation. We depart from DEHS (2008) by assuming different scenar-
ios of data structure. This can be achieved by controlling the data generating process. If
data history matters, we would expect to see the portfolio-loss estimation results affected
dramatically by different data structures. This finding has an important implication for
assessing the credit risk of senior CDO tranches, which confines their loss to tail default
distribution of the underlying collaterals.
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III. Frailty Correlated Default Model and
Simulation Method
One firm default status may have impact on another firm’s default probability. Acharya,
Schaefer, and Zhang (2008) document the impact of GM and Ford downgrade on the
entire market constituents, even though some of them are completely unrelated to GM
and Ford. Jorion and Zhang (2007) conduct a larger scale analysis over bankruptcies
and find similar results. The reason for these seemingly unrelated firms sharing a default
factor can be learning, as argued by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) and
Giesecke (2004) or market structure as argued by Allen and Carletti (2006).
A. Dynamic Frailty Model
Motivated by the definitive finding of excessive default clustering in Das, Duffie, Kapadia,
and Saita (2007), Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2008) propose a frailty correlated
default model, in which default intensity of firm i at time t takes a proportional hazard
specification as
λit = Λ(Si(Xt), θ)
= exp(α+ β · Vt + γ · Uit + Yt + Zi). (1)
Default events are driven by three types of factors:
1. Observable macroeconomic factors (Vt), including market-wide stock returns and
interest rates. Demchuk and Gibson (2006) argue that stock market performance
is an important credit spread determinant.
2. Observable firm-specific factors (Uit) such as a firm’s “distance-to-default” and
trailing stock return. Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) examine the predictive power
of these observable factors and achieve the highest out-of-sample prediction accu-
racy ratio among then available models.
3. Unobservable common frailty factor Yt and firm heterogeneous frailty factor Zi.
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Conditional independence of default arrivals is regained under the assumption that ad-
ditional default clustering could be captured by the frailty factors. They apply an
iterative procedure combining Monte Carlo integration and maximum likelihood esti-
mation to compute the intensity parameter θ. Gibbs sampler is employed to draw the
posterior distribution of the latent frailty factors.7 Details of the model are provided in
Appendix A and the estimation algorithm are provided in Appendix B.
B. Simulation Approach
Simulation study helps understand the full picture of model performance. Misspecifi-
cation of a model leads to biased estimation and might eventually produce deflected
prediction. For example, when common-frailty-driven defaults are not accounted for, we
underestimate the possible extreme losses of a credit portfolio.8 Historical data plays a
critical role in empirical model performance. With limited data, model estimation may
be sensitive to data structures.9 Long run means of the underlying factors are often
challenging to tie down if monthly data is employed.
To assess the model specification and data history effects, we simulate a series of data
structures, each of which accompanies with a specific economic scenario. The number
of firms simulated is 2800 and the history lasts for 25 years. To keep akin to the factor
dynamics implied in the real historic data, we employ the same Gaussian first-order
vector autoregressive model for the observable factors in Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007)
and the same Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with long run mean 0 for the common frailty
factor as specified in Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2008). The time step is taken to be
one month. Here we give a brief review of this factor time series model. The maximum
likelihood parameter estimation, which is provided in Appendix B of Duffie, Saita and
Wang (2007), is listed in Appendix C.
A simple arbitrage-free two-factor affine term-structure model is specified for the
7Zi is difficult to pin down given the size of the data used in their paper. Furthermore, its presence
does not qualitatively change the significance of Yt. Therefore, this unobservable firm heterogeneity is
opted out of their final model for portfolio credit risk evaluation.
8As shown in the realized portfolio loss quantile test in Figure 9 of Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita
(2008)
9Public firms rarely go to default. Among the total 2793 companies in Duffie, Eckner, Horel and
Saita (2008), 496 defaults occurred during the 25 years from 1979 to 2003.
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three month treasury rates (r1t) and 10-year treasury rates (r2t).
rt+1 = rt + kr(θr − rt) + Crεt+1, (2)
where θr is the long-run mean of interest rates, Cr is a 2 × 2 matrix, and ε1, ε2 . . . are
independent standard normal vectors.
For firm specific factors of distance to default Dit and log-assets Vit, and trailing
1-year S&P 500 return,10[
Di,t+1
Vi,t+1
]
=
[
Dit
Vit
]
+
[
kD 0
0 kV
]([
θiD
θiV
]
−
[
Dit
Vit
])
+
[
b · (θr − rt)
0
]
+
[
σD 0
0 σV
]
ηi,t+1, (3)
St+1 = St + ks(θs − St) + ξt+1, (4)
where θiD, θiV are long-run means for firm i’s distance to default and log assets, respec-
tively. ηit is the two dimensional innovation vector.
Correlation among the observable factors is modeled as
ηi,t = Azit +Bwt,
ξt = αSut + γSwt, (5)
where zit and wt are independent two-dimensional standard normal vectors and ut are
independent standard normals.
For tractability and parsimony, the mean-reverting speed kD of distance to default
is assume to be homogeneous across all firms. Distance to default is an asset volatility
adjusted measure of leverage and its volatility σD does not vary by firm as implied by
Merton’s theory. Asset volatility σV and its mean-reverting speed kV are also assumed
to be homogeneous across firms. However, a common targeted leverage ratio leads to
unrealistic estimated term structure of future default probabilities. Duffie, Saita and
Wang (2007) instead estimate θiD firm by firm, with the cross-sectional distribution
10Firm asset value is solved using the Merton’s model. For more details, refer to Merton (1974),
Crosbie and Bohn (2002) and Vassaulou and Xing (2004).
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displayed in figure 12 of their paper. In our simulation study, we load the long run
means of distance to default and log assets for each firm in the following way.
As reported in Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007), the estimated θiD across the whole
firm set has a median of 3.1, with interquartile range of 1.4-4.8. A careful inspection of
figure 12 reveals that the interval 0.0-8.0 of θiD covers most of the firms except those
at the extreme lower or upper tail of the distribution. And within this interval, θiD is
approximately linear to the rank of firm i, which means that θiD might be uniformly
distributed on this range. Accordingly, we parameterize θiD as
θiD ∼ U(0.0, 8.0), (6)
where U denotes the uniform distribution.
Long run means of log assets are not reported in Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007). Here
we turn to Bharath and Shumway (2008) who apply a similar estimation procedure and
provide the quartiles of estimates for an augmented firm set.11 The reported asset value
ranges from 1.52 to 22949.32 (log asset value from 0.4 to 10.0).12 For simplicity, we
assume in our simulation that θiV is uniformly distributed on this interval:
θiV ∼ U(0.4, 10.0). (7)
To generate time series for the observable factors, we need to make further assump-
tions of the starting value of the factor processes and the entry time of each firm.
Following the common practice, all factors are assumed to start at their long run means.
We are left with roughly 1400 active firms at the end of the data period after subtracting
the number of defaults and merger-acquisition from the total number of firms in Duffie,
Saita and Wang (2007).13 Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) provide average num-
ber of active firms in each year from 1963 to 2003 in a lager data set. This number
increases from 4342 in 1980 to 7833 in 2003. Proportional to this growth rate, in the
simulation we assume that 800 firms exist at the beginning of the data period. The
11Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) consider 2770 industrial firms from 1980 to 2004, with 497 defaults
identified. Bharath and Shumway (2008) examine all firms in the intersection of the Compustat Indus-
trial file—Quarterly data and CRSP daily stock return for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ between 1980
and 2003, excluding the financial firms. They obtain total 1449 defaults.
12Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by Bharath and Shumway.
13We do not deduct “other exits” since most of this type are various data gaps.
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other 2000 firms enter evenly in the following 25 years.
Once time series for distance to default and log assets are available, we can get the
face value of debt (Lt) and market value of equity (Wt) of each firm i by sequentially
solving the following two equations. Let Vt denotes asset value at time t, then
Dt =
ln(Vt/Lt) + (µA − 12σ2V )T
σV
√
T
; (8)
Wt = VtΦ(d1)− Lte−rTΦ(d2), (9)
where d1 =
ln(Vt/Lt)+(r+
1
2
σ2V )T
σV
√
T
, d2 = d1 − σA
√
T , Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. r is the risk free interest rate measured as the 3-month treasury
rates.
We take the forecast horizon to be 12 months. We avoid solving for the asset volatility
in virtue of the assumption of their homogeneity across all firms as specified in equation
3. Its value is fixed at the maximum likelihood estimate of 0.1169. Some scholars
provide various approaches to estimate the expected asset drift rate µA.
14 In this paper,
we deviate from all these methods by making use of the mean-reversion property of the
log assets process. We calculate µV as the expected mean-reversion during the next
period.
µV − 1
2
σ2V = kV (θV − ln(Vt)) (10)
Taking µV and σV into equation 8, we can directly derive the debt value Lt. The time
series for firm’s market equity follows from the call-option pricing formula as stated in
equation 9. It is unrealistic to assume a constant level of face value of debt in a time
period as long as 25 years. Combining the assumptions of leverage targeting and mean-
reverting asset process, we allow a firm to dynamically adjust their outstanding debt,
as suggested by Collin-Dufrensne and Goldstein (2001).15
14Vassalou and Xing (2004) calculate firm specific average returns on each stock. Bharath and
Shumway(2008) estimate previous year asset return. Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004)
use previous year asset return, but replace it with the risk free interest rate if this return is negative.
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) use 0.06, an empirical proxy for equity premium, plus risk free
risk as an estimate.
15Collin-Dufrensne and Goldstein (2001) and Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) show that dynamic debt
adjustment and leverage targeting could generate more realistic term structure of default probabilities.
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Now we come to the determination of the exit time for each firm. There are three ma-
jor types of exits defined in Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007), defaults, merger-acquisition
and “other exits”. Each type of exit will not restrict the intensity parameter estimation
of the other types.16 Since “other exits” are mostly data gaps of various types, they
are less relevant for our study and we exclude them for simplicity. As argued in Duffie,
Saita and Wang (2007), merger-acquisition has relatively little effect on default hazard
rate and merger-acquisition itself need not prevent future default if debts are not paid
back immediately. Here we do not consider merger-acquisition exits, either.
We calculate default intensity as
λit = e
α+β1Dit+β2Rit+β3rt+β4St+yt , (11)
where Rit is the trailing 1-year stock return. (α, β) = (-1.029, -1.201, -0.646, -0.255,
1.556), the real data estimates reported in Table II of Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita
(2008). A hypothetic frailty path, which remains latent in reality, is generate with mean-
reverting speed 0.03 and volatility 0.15, which come from the marginal frailty parameter
posterior distribution in Figure 6 in Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita(2008).
For firm i, the conditional probability of survival from entry time ti to some future
time si before the data cutoff date Ti is given by
pi(ti, si) = e
−∑sit=ti λit∆t (12)
∆t equals to one month.
Default time is simulated using the Inverse-CDF method offered in Duffie and Sin-
gleton (1999). For each firm i, we draw a uniform random number U . Default time τ is
determined as
τ = inf{si : pi(ti, si) ≤ U, ti ≤ si ≤ Ti} (13)
If pi(ti, Ti) > U , the firm never defaults in our data period.
Now we can put our factor time series and default timing data into the frailty model
to estimate the default intensity parameters. By extending the factor time series with
16See Proposition 2 of Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007).
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the pre-specified model, we can evaluate the credit risk of any portfolio constructed on
the underlying firms in our data set.
C. Validation Tests
As shown in Figure 5 of Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2008), the latent factor plays a
crucial role in the tail of the probability density of predicted number of defaults in future
5 years. Common source of current level of and future shocks to this latent factor enlarges
the risk of heavily clustered defaults remarkably. Thus the filtered-out latent factor path
and the mean-reverting speed, κ, and volatility, η, which govern its time series dynamics,
are of gravity to assess the modeled correlation risk. Maximum likelihood estimates of
the default intensity parameters converges to the true data generating process when the
number of firms and number of time periods become large. It is helpful to do some
convergence test first when working with limited real data.
According to the doubly stochastic assumption, estimation of the factor time series
model could be separated from estimation of the default intensity parameters. We focus
on the the default intensity estimation and also check the posterior distribution of the
filtered frailty factor through the Bayesian analysis. Using the simulation approach
described in the previous section, we simulate one set of the observable macro economic
factors and firm specific factors, and one hypothetic frailty path. Then for 100 times,
we draw a new U , the default trigger, for each firm and let default time be determined
accordingly. It corresponds to 100 different realizations of the firm-default history. The
maximum number of defaults recorded is 648 and minimum 573. We estimate the frailty
model for each realization. The mean frailty path is shown in Figure 1 and the parameter
estimation is provided in Table I.
We can see that the mean filtered frailty paths tightly follow the “true” frailty path.
Correlation between filtered frailty and “true” frailty ranges from 0.87 to 0.96. Estimated
intensity parameter is close to the true data generating process. Root mean square
error of estimated intensity parameter is moderate and of similar magnitude to the
standard error of parameter estimation provided in Table II of Duffie, Eckner, Horel and
Saita (2008). It is relatively safe to conclude that the model appropriately pins down
the intangible risk embedded in the latent frailty factor and the intensity parameter
estimation is not likely to be heavily skewed given available 25 years’ firm-default history.
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IV. Simulation Results
Using the dynamic-frailty model as a benchmark, we demonstrate in this section the
effects of various model misspecifications and data limitations to the portfolio credit
risk assessment.
A. Model Specification
A.1. No-frailty versus Dynamic-frailty Model
Even for single-obligor credit risk modeling, there is no consensus on the best perform-
ing model. Model failure has been recorded in nearly all areas. The seminal work of
Vasicek (1987) on portfolio credit risk is shown to be inaccurate for heterogenous asset
pools (Hanson, Pesaran, and Schuermann (2008)). More seriously, default correlation
is assumed to be driven only by observable factors. This counterfactual assumption
is widely adopted until recently. However, we believe existing CDOs are almost all
evaluated based on this low correlation assumption.
In order to understand to what extent CDO mispricing might be due to an omitted
latent factor, we formally conduct analysis of portfolio default rate prediction with no-
frailty and dynamic-frailty model. The simulated 25 years data of observable factors
is summarized in Panel A of Table II and the estimated no-frailty and dynamic-frailty
model is listed in Panel B of Table II. The total across firm default intensities from the
no-frailty and dynamic-frailty models are plotted in Figure 2 together with the number
of defaults in each year. We form a portfolio with all active firms at the end of year
25. Figure 3 shows the portfolio’s future five years default rate distribution generated
by no-frailty and dynamic-frailty model. Panel C of Table II shows the quantiles of
the default rate distribution. The 0.95, 0.99 and 0.999 quantiles for no-frailty model
prediction is 14.29%, 17.33% and 21.01%, respectively, and 11.66%, 13.41%, and 15.55%
for dynamic-frailty model prediction, respectively. If we take the 0.999 quantile as the
SDR for AAA rating, frailty factor will bring down the AAA tranche size by 5.4%.
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A.2. “Greenspan Put” Effect
In the US market, many investors believe that they are protected by a Greenspan put.17
Whenever the market undergoes a crisis, the Fed will step in and cut interest rates
to inject liquidity to the market. Generally, this kind of monetary policy creates a
correlation between the short term interest rate and stock market performance.
In Duffie, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2008), interest rates are assumed to be indepen-
dent of stock market index trailing return. To incorporate this Greenspan effect, we
impose a correlation (lag one) between the interest rates and the market return by in-
troducing correlation ρ between the innovation terms of 3 month interest rate ε1,t+1 and
S&P 500 trailing return ξt. Historically, the lag one correlation between the innovations
of 3 month interest rate and S&P 500 return is about 0.18 during the 10 years from
1997 to 2006. This period is the last ten years when Greenspan was in office of Federal
reserve, and also a time when the CDO market experienced exponential growth. For
illustration purpose, we opt for an correlation of 0.3.
Based on the simulated historical time series (with correlation), we compare the
model prediction with and without Greenspan effect (ρ equals to 0.3 and 0 respectively).
Summary of factor time series are provided in Panel A of Table III, estimated frailty
model in Panel B, and quantiles of predicted portfolio default rate in Panel C. Figure
4 shows the portfolio’s future five years default rate distribution generated by dynamic-
frailty model with correlated and uncorrelated macro factors. We can see that the
portfolio default rate is slightly higher when correlation is introduced. The difference is
0.09%, 0.14% and 0.14% for 0.95, 0.99, and 0.999 quantiles, respectively. In spite of the
intention to stabilize the economy, the insignificant change in risk profiles suggested that
there is little real effect in a sense of protecting firms from defaults. This insignificant
tail effect of model with Greenspan effect might be interpreted by the “Greenspan put”.
Based on the perception of Greenspan put protection in (extreme) bad economic state,
firms tend to overtake risk. This moral hazard effect to some extend offsets the original
purpose of Greenspan monetary policy. Our results also implies that the assumption of
zero correlation between interest rates and stock market return in the dynamic-frailty
model does not have significant effect to the default estimation results.
17Greenspan put may be encouraging complacency, Wall Street Journal, December 08, 2000.
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A.3. Structural Break
Andreou and Ghysels (2008) emphasize the effect of structural shifts to the credit risk
structural model. Instead of fixing the structural model parameter at some points, they
point out that it is necessary taking into account of the structural parameter variation.
Failed to considering the effects, may results in biased inferences based on the credit
model. In this section, we examine the effect of parameter structural breaks for default
prediction.
To demonstrate potential structural break, the 25 years of historical data is split
into the former 20 years and the latter 5 years. For the former 20 years, default time
are simulated use intensity parameters (α, β) = (-1.029, -1.000, -0.646, -0.255, 1.556).
For the latter 5 years, we change to (α, β) = (-1.029, -1.400, -0.646, -0.255, 1.556).
Thus, a structure break with respect to the intensity parameter of distance to default
is embedded in the historical data. The factor time series are summarized in Panel A
of Table IV. We estimate the frailty model as though there is no break and results
are provided in Panel B of Table IV. We investigate the structural break effect by
comparing the default prediction from estimated model assuming no break and the true
model governing firm defaults in the last 5 years. Predicted default rate distribution is
shown in Figure 5 and quantiles of default distribution are provided in Panel C of Table
IV.
We find modest effect of structural break with the presence of frailty factor. The
0.95, 0.99 and 0.999 quantiles from the true model is 14.27%, 17.48% and 21.48%,
respectively, compared to 13.05%, 15.78% and 19.08% from the model assuming no
break. The difference is 2.4% at the 0.999 quantile.
B. Data History Effects
B.1. Length of Available Data
Data availability is an important concern when we are doing maximum likelihood esti-
mation. Data structure might shift from decade to decade, even year by year. Limited
historic data in deficiency of typical economic states leads to biased estimation results
and sometimes is detrimental for prediction. The current credit crunch is frequently im-
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puted to the financial innovations, like CDO and CDS, which are organized from models
based on very short time-horizon data history. We lay out a data history test, exploiting
the dynamic frailty model, to see how the availability of historical data will affect the
tails of the predicted default rate distribution.
We truncate our dataset generated with frailty in the former section A.1. and save
the last 10 and 5 years. 5-10 years is close to the actual data history of large volume
issuance of CDO or CDS. We estimate the dynamic-frailty model with the limited data
history, with results presented in Panel A of Table V. We can see that as we have shorter
available historical data, parameter estimates become less significant. The frailty factor
dies away in the 5 years case since it has a low volatility of 0.07 and a very high mean-
reverting speed close to 1.
The predicted default rate distribution is shown in Figure 6. Quantiles in Panel B of
Table V show that the model estimated with 10 years’ data underestimates the right rail
most, 5.4% for the 0.999 quantile, while the model with 5 years’ data underestimates the
left tail most, 1.1% for the 0.05 quantile. The non-monotonic data length effect is of the
same magnitude as the difference between the no-frailty and dynamic-frailty models.
B.2. Realization of Economic States
Business cycle tends to affect all firms in the economy. Co-movements of firms are very
important to assess the risk profile of super-senior CDO tranches which only suffer when
extreme loss occurs. In common CDO rating practice, the dynamics of macroeconomic
factors are seldom taken into consideration. Here we demonstrate the effect different
economic conditions might impose on portfolio default loss. We assign one set of targeted
distance to default and long run asset level to each firm and maintain the same level for
each firm in the following simulation. Starting from the same macroeconomic condition,
we repeat the data simulation process for several times. Each simulation represents a
random realization of firm default history. The realization with smallest default number
is picked out as good economic state, and largest as the bad economic state. The frailty
model is estimated for both states. The results are presented in table VI and figure 8
shows the predicted default rate distribution.
Firm quality is controlled to be the same in a sense that each firm has the same
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targeted distance to default and long run asset level in each simulation. However, we
experience a larger number of defaults in the bad economic state. The default rate
quantiles in Table VI shows that instead of reversing to lower default rate in the future,
the bad economy predicts a 4.3% higher default rate at the 0.999 quantile.
B.3. Data Quality
Duffie and Lando (2001) suggests that noise in issuer’s asset value due to the incomplete
accounting information reshapes the term structure of credit spreads of corporate bonds.
Firms might jump to default even in a very short maturity. The same is true for distance
to default. The estimation of distance to default might deviate from the true value since
we could only get periodic and noisy accounting data. Distance to default estimation
error is also a source of the frailty factor. Since systematic biases in distance to default
estimation has already been captured by the common frailty variable, here instead we
focus on whether the frailty model can work properly if the estimation contains some
white noise. The usual way to perform noise test is to engage the signal to noise ratio,
which is the proportion of the standard deviation of the signal to that of the noise. We
add a 10% and 20% firm specific noise to the true distance to default simulated in former
section A.1, corresponding to signal to noise ratio 10 and 5, respectively.18
The estimated model and predicted default rate quantiles are provided in Panel
A and Panel B of Table VII, respectively. Figure 9 shows the predicted default rate
distribution. We can see that the intensity parameter for distance to default all remains
highly significant, although slowly decreasing in absolute value as the noise becomes
louder. Comparing the quantiles predicted without noise to the those predicted with
signal to noise ratio 10 and 5, the differences are all less than 2%. The frailty model
displays robustness to unsystematic noise in distance to default estimation.
To sum up, common frailty factor, historical data length and macroeconomic state
have large effects on the predicted portfolio default rate. However, in the presence of
frailty factor, model prediction is relatively robust to structural breaks in default inten-
sity process and noise in distance to default estimation. Correlation between macroeco-
nomic factors has actually little impact on the default rate distribution.
18The noise is assume to be mean-reverting following Duffie and Lando (2001).
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V. Empirical Evidence
Our simulation results suggest the potential effects of model specification and data his-
tory on CDO valuation. We conduct corresponding empirical analysis in this section.
We first describe our sample CDO data. The empirical method is demonstrated in a
case study. Specifically, we carry out credit risk evaluation on CDO AAA tranches using
both the no-frailty model and dynamic-frailty model. We scrutinize the ability of the
benchmark dynamic-frailty model to predict subsequent downgrading of the senior AAA
rated CDO tranches over our sample CDOs.
A. Data Description
Our sample contains 279 CDOs issued between October 1997 and December 2004.19 The
distribution according to collateral asset type is as follows: 65 CBOs, 94 CLOs, 103 ABS
CDOs and 17 CDO2s. We obtain the first report after the ramp-up of the asset portfolio
with the following collateral asset characteristics:
• Closing date (CDate): The date the CDO is purchased by investors.
• Number of obligors (N): Number of distinct obligors for the collateral asset portfolio.
• Weighted average rating (WAR): Average credit rating of the collateral asset portfolio,
weighted by the par amount of each asset.
• Weighted average maturity (WAM): Average maturity of the collateral asset portfolio,
weighted by the par amount.
• Default measure (DM): The average expected default rate of collateral assets, weighted
by the par amount and annualized with average asset maturity.
• Variability measure (VM): The annualized standard deviation of collateral asset de-
fault rates, which measures the dispersion of underlying assets without consideration
of correlation.
Table VIII describes CDO name, closing date, number of obligors, weighted average
rating, weighted average maturity for each CDO in our sample. We also list the number
19We stop the data in 2004 due to the availability of frailty factors. Additionally, the CDO market
has explosive growth with some irregular activities during the 2005-2007 period. Consequently, non-
structural factors could drive CDO pricing after 2004.
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of notches downgraded as of December 2, 2008 for the initially AAA rated tranches and
the SDRs at report date for the initial rating. For the downgraded notches, number 0
denotes never downgraded and number 1-19 correspond to downgrading from AAA to
AA+ all the way down to CC. We have 10 CDOs downgraded in our sample CBOs,
0 in CLOs, 54 in ABS CDOs and 2 in CDO2s. SDR is the required subordination, or
the percentage of portfolio loss rate a CDO tranche at a given rating level must sustain
without causing a cash flow event of default. The probability of default in the assets
portfolio exceeding this percentage is no greater than historical default probability of
corporate bonds with the same rating. For example, if the portfolio default distribution
is as the one with frailty in figure 3 and the average realized default probability for
AAA rated corporate bond is 0.1%, then the SDR for AAA tranche is 21.01%, the 0.999
quantile. Once SDR for a desired tranche rating is available, the tranche size can be
determined as no greater than 1-SDR.20
B. A Case Study and Methodology
We first illustrate our CDO valuation method via an example case analysis. All 4 types
of CDOs are valuated in a similar way. The chosen CDO is called Independence I.
This CDO is collateralized with various ABS securities including CMBS, RMBS, ABS,
and CDO. We demonstrate how we evaluate this ABS CDO and how the frailty model
generates results to predict ultimate downgrade.
Independence I is issued by Independence I CDO, Ltd. (a special purpose vehicle
registered in Cayman Islands) and co-issued by Independence I CDO Inc. (a special
purpose vehicle registered in Delaware). (The Independence series continue to Indepen-
dence VII issued on March 28, 2006.) The closing date is December 7, 2000 according to
Moody’s and December 12, 2000 according to S&P. Credit Suisse is the lead underwriter
and counterparty for interest rate swap agreements. The collateral manager is Indepen-
dence Fixed Income Associates Inc. (renamed Declaration Research and Management
LLC. in 2003). From Moody’s New Issue report dated April 13, 2001, the collateral pool
is fully ramped by March 12, 2001 (about 65% complete at closing date).
Independence I has an initial principle amount of US$300 million with the following
capital structure: Class A first priority senior secured notes $223.5 million (74.5%),
20In some cases, a larger fraction is achieved through other credit enhancements such as insurance.
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Class B second priority senior secured notes $50 million, Class C Mezzanine secured
notes $15 million, and preference share 11.5 million.21 Moody’s initially assigns AAA
rating to Class A tranche, followed by the Class B with Aa3, and Class C with Baa2.
Preference shares are not rated. S&P assigns AAA rating to Class A. However, S&P
does not rate Class B, Class C and preference shares. Fitch also provides Class A with
AAA rating, Class B with AA-, Class C with BBB and preference shares not rated.
Class A of this CDO is subsequently downgraded to AA- rating on August 30, 2004 and
further downgraded to A- on November 16, 2005 by S&P. Fitch downgrades Class A to
A on March 7, 2006, further to BB on March 9, 2009. Moody’s downgrades Class A to
AA2 on February 18, 2005, to Baa2 on February 2, 2007, and further to B1 and placed
under review for possible downgrade on April 22, 2009.
The collateral asset characteristics reported on December 26, 2003 before any down-
grade are as follows: the collateral asset portfolio contains 95 assets from 83 obligors,
with weighted average rating of BBB-, weighted average maturity of 8.45 years, average
expected asset default rate 0.0112, variability of the default rate of 0.0162. For the AAA
rating of this collateral portfolio, a rating agency derives scenario default rate of 29.2%
using a default rate threshold of 0.0073.
To apply the no-frailty model and the dynamic-frailty model to this ABS CDO,
we adopt the maximum likelihood estimation of the factor times series dynamics and
default intensity parameters provided in Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) and Duffie,
Eckner, Horel, and Saita(2008). The frailty factor estimation available is up to the end
of year 2003. For a CDO with closing date in the year 2004 (may be initiated in 2003),
We extend this factor to date through the OU process dynamics starting from the end
month of 2003. The 3-month treasury bill rate and S&P 500 index are obtained from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system and CRSP database, respectively.
We choose the WAM of the CDO as the prediction horizon and we assume each obligor
has an equal amount of principal in the asset pool.
Collateral pools of CDOs consist of various types of assets such as corporate bonds,
leveraged loans, sovereign debts, ABS tranches and CDO tranches. Our exemplificative
ABS CDO is comprised of 41.8% commercial mortgage-backed securities, 23% residential
mortgage-backed security assets, 21.4% asset-backed securities, and 13.8% CDO assets.
21Those numbers are provided by Moody’s new issue report. S&P record has preference share size
$12 million.
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It is prohibitive to estimate the distance to default and asset process for these complex
securitized products. Instead, some rating agencies use average default probability of
the same rating cohort to proxy for the default probability of the same type of assets and
assume pairwise correlation among the obligors based on industry sector and geographic
region. For example, S&P’s CDO Evaluator and Fitch’s VECTOR give default proba-
bility based on asset type, rating and maturity.22 Furthermore, for CBOs and CLOs, the
obligor might be a private firm and even such rating is not available. Therefore, in our
study, we do not go into obligor-by-obligor estimation for distance to default and asset
processes. For simplicity and tractability, we make use of the portfolio average expected
default rate (DM) and variability of default rate (VM). We assume that default prob-
ability of each obligor in the collateral portfolio is log-normally distributed with mean
DM and standard deviation VM times square root of N , the number of obligors. We
choose log-normal distribution in light of non-negative default probabilities and right-
skewed default rate distribution. Then we equally draw N quantiles of the log-normal
distribution on the interval (0, 1) and assign these quantiles as the default rates of the
obligors.
The sampled default probability of obligor i, DPi, is transformed into targeted dis-
tance to default, θiD, through the inverse cumulative normal distribution function Φ
−1:
θiD = −Φ−1(DPi), (14)
For simplicity, we assume that long run means of the assets of each obligor is uni-
formly distributed on some quartile range of the asset values as estimated in Bharath
and Shumway (2008). Specifically, we choose for CBOs the uppermost quartile, 6.3-
10.0, in view of the fact that CBOs mostly consist of bonds issued by relative large-cap
companies. We choose for CLOs the 0.25-0.5 quartile, 3.3-4.7, since most underlying
assets of CLOs are leveraged loans from small and median size firms. For ABS CDOs
and CDO2s, we do not have a strong prior reason to choose a particular asset span and
simply use the interquartile range, 3.3-6.3.23 Empirical evidence in Titman and Wessels
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Fama and French (2002) shows that larger firms
22For each asset type, default probabilities across all ratings and for typical maturities are estimated
from historical default data of that specific type. Sometimes adjusted default probabilities from other
asset types are used when the historical data is scarce for a recent innovation.
23For ABS CDOs and CDO2s, our SDR prediction is not sensitive to the asset span when it is shifted
down to the lower interquartile 0.4-4.7 or up to the upper interquartile 4.7-10.0.
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tend to have higher leverage. Thus we assign in reverse order the long run means of
assets to targeted distance to default for each obligor. Then a larger obligor in our
sample has a lower targeted distance to default.
Given the firm specific factors starting from its long run means, we apply the no-
frailty model and dynamic-frailty model to generate the portfolio default rate distribu-
tion for each CDO and decide the SDRs accordingly. The results are provided in Table
VIII. For Independence I, the SDR is 29.2% by rating agency, 25.3% predicted by the
no-frailty model and 51.8% predicted by the dynamic-frailty model. Our benchmark
dynamic-frailty model allows a AAA tranche of 48.2%. However, the SDR by rating
agency allows for 70.8%. Here we construct a variable Ri for CDO i as:
Ri = SDRDF,i − SDRi (15)
where SDRDF,i is the SDR predicted by the dynamic-frailty model and SDRi is the
SDR by rating agency. Ri denotes the deviation of AAA tranche size with the dynamic-
frailty model prediction as the benchmark. A positive Ri implies aggressive rating and
negative Ri implies conservative rating. Therefore, higher Ri corresponds to riskier AAA
rated tranche. For our case Independence I, Ri equals to 22.6%, which reveals its high
risk-bearing. Note that the Class A tranche with initial AAA rating from all three rating
agencies is eventually downgraded to BB credit rating.
C. Empirical Results
The estimated SDRs from the no-frailty model and dynamic-frailty model are presented
in Table VIII and plotted by closing date in Figure 10 together with the SDRs by rating
agency. The no-frailty model estimation is highly correlated to the SDRs by rating
agency, with correlation 0.90 for CBO, 0.85 for CLO, 0.89 for ABS CDO and 0.74 for
CDO2, respectively. Compared with no-frailty model estimation, on average the SDRs
by rating agency overestimate by 10% for CBO, 7% for CLOs, 5%for ABS CDO and 14%
for CDO2, respectively. However, when frailty factor is considered, on average the SDRs
by rating agency underestimate by 11% for CBO, 14% for CLOs, 12%for ABS CDO and
4% for CDO2, respectively. Over all 279 CDOs in the sample, dynamic-frailty model
predicts SDRs on average 12% higher than those by rating agency, while the no-frailty
model predicts 7% lower.
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According to our empirical results, if we only consider observable factors for our
portfolio credit risk evaluation, the SDRs by rating agency, which are the primary de-
terminants of the assigned rating, overestimated the portfolio risk on average for all four
types of CDOs. For CDO2s, overestimation is most prominent. Once the extra source
of risk, the common frailty which systematically affects the whole economy, is taken
into account, risks of all 4 types of CDOs are underestimated by the SDRs from rating
agency. ABS CDOs are most directly related to the subprime mortgage crisis and have
experienced widespread downgradings even for AAA rated tranches. Of the 103 ABS
CDO in our sample, 54 are downgraded by one or more rating agencies. 10 downgrades
are recorded in our sample of 65 CBOs and 94 CLOs. The dynamic-frailty model pre-
dicts the large risk underestimation, over 10%, for CBOs and CLOs. We expect to see
more downgrades of these two types in the future. The frailty factor is very important to
understand the risks embedded in the AAA tranches. It brings down the AAA tranche
size by about 19% when added to the model.
Since most downgrades recorded in our sample happen to ABS CDO, we conduct
a downgrading prediction study with respect to ABS CDOs in our sample. Ri of ABS
CDOs ranges from -0.29 to 0.28. We separate the ABS CDOs into 4 categories according
their risk level as measured by Ri. The 1st low risk category is with Ri from -0.3 to 0.
The 2nd risk category is with Ri from 0 to 0.1. The 3rd risk category is with Ri from
0.1 to 0.2. The 4th high risk category is with Ri from 0.2 to 0.3. As shown in Figure
11, 5 CDOs falls in the 1st low risk category, 17 in the 2nd, 71 in the 3rd and 10 in
the last high risk category. The average rate of downgrades for CDOs in the low risk
category is 0, in contrast with average downgrading rate of 24%, 46% and 80% for the
following three riskier categories, respectively. Our benchmark dynamic-frailty model
exhibits high power to separate out the safest and riskiest CDOs.
To better understand the model performance, we draw the power curve of our pre-
diction in Figure 12. As in the standard accuracy ratio test, the horizontal axis of the
power curve denotes the riskiest x fraction of CDOs, ranked by Ri. The vertical axis
gives the fraction of downgrades included in the riskiest x fraction. Accuracy ratio is
measured as twice the area between the power curve and the 45 degree line. In our
case, the highest value in theory is 0.56. Our dynamic-frailty model prediction gives an
accuracy ratio of 0.21. It does have power to predict subsequent downgrading of AAA
tranches. For a CDO with an median size of $600 million and maturity 7 years, the
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average 12% AAA tranche inflation will lead to an underpayment of about $1.5 million
to the investors if this 12% should actually be rated as AA and yield spread is 30 basis
points between AAA and AA rated CDO tranches. The accuracy ratio of 21% will on
average gain the investors $0.32 million, comparable to CDO rating fees (usually around
$0.5 million).
The power curve also tells us that our dynamic-frailty model does not do very well
in the median risk range. This might reflect the fact that in reality the ultimate AAA
tranche size comprises some final adjustments to the amount approved by the SDR from
rating agency model results. In our case study of Independence I, the AAA tranche size
is 74.5% while the SDR by rating agency allows for 70.8%. Another possible reason
is that rating agencies make tradeoffs between rating stability and timeliness. Altman
and Rijken (2005) confirms the exclusive focus of agency ratings on the permanent
component of credit quality and disregard of the temporary component. Our empirical
results implies that we should see more downgrades of CDO AAA tranches in the future.
Further research with more available data samples and longer rating history will surely
give us a more comprehensive understanding.
Since higher Ri denotes more risk, the AAA tranch is expected to be downgraded to
a lower credit rating when the deviation is higher. Here we do a regression of the AAA
tranche downgraded notches on the risk proxy, Ri. The downgraded notches (DG) are
shown in Table VIII.
DGi = a+ b ·Ri + εi (16)
We expect b to be positive and significant. For the 103 ABS CDOs, b equal to 18.6 with
t-statistic 2.3. b is significant at the 5% confidence level. R square for this regression is
5%.
VI. Conclusion
One of the most remarkable episodes of the ongoing 2007-2009 credit crisis is the
widespread downgrading of top rated (often cases AAA) CDO securities and overwhelm-
ing write-downs resulting from CDO revaluation. In this paper we analyze the structural
causes of CDO mispricing. Our simulation results suggest that model mis-specification
and data quality can have substantial effects on CDO valuation. The frailty default fac-
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tor identified by Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2008) is especially important. Ignoring
the frailty factor might inflate the AAA tranche of a CDO by about 5.4%. Consequently,
the AAA tranche would have been rated much lower had we considered the frailty factor
and other data issues.
We conduct empirical analysis on 279 CDOs issued between October 1997 and De-
cember 2004. Our no-frailty model obtains CDO portfolio default rate at AAA level
close to rating agency estimates, except for CDO2s. However, considering frailty factor
will raise the AAA portfolio default rate by 21% for CBOs, 21% for CLOs, 17% for
ABS CDOs, 18% for CDO2s relative to no-frailty model. Furthermore, the relative risk
increase for ABS CDOs which experienced the most AAA downgrades in our sample
can predict future downgrade as of December 2, 2008 (with an accuracy ratio of 0.21).
Hence, the information content in the frailty factor is economically significant.
Understanding the pricing of CDO is useful for future regulatory policies and risk
management strategies, as future financial innovation will likely be accompanied by
similar issues on model specification and data quality. The frailty model and Bayesian
estimation approach discussed in this paper will be useful for portfolio credit risk analysis
as default data is scarce. Prior belief can shape the result in significant ways. Exploring
the economic sources of the frailty factor and formation of prior belief about default
correlation is left for future research.
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Appendices
A Dynamic Frailty Model
Following Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita(2008), we define a Markov state Vector Xt
which include both firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates Uit, Vt and Yt. If Xt is
fully observable, the default intensity λit for a given firm i at time t will be
λit = Λ(Si(Xt); θ)
= eα+β·Vt+ϑ·Uit+Yt (17)
where Si(Xt) represents the component of Xt that is relevant to the default intensity of
firm i, θ represents the parameter vector for default intensity to be estimated.
The likelihood of the data at the parameters (γ, θ) is given by
L(γ, θ|W,Y,D)
= L(γ|W )L(θ|W,Y,D)
= L(γ|W )
m∏
i=1
(e−
∑Ti
t=ti
λit∆t
Ti∏
t=ti
[Ditλit∆t+ (1−Dit)]). (18)
where η is the parameter governing the dynamics of Vt, Uit.
However, given that Yt is not observable to the econometrician, the likelihood is then
L(γ, θ|W,D)
=
∫
L(γ, θ|W, y,D)pY (y)dy
= L(γ|W )
∫
L(θ|W, y,D)pY (y)dy
= L(γ|W )E[
m∏
i=1
(e−
∑Ti
t=ti
λit∆t
Ti∏
t=ti
[Ditλit∆t+ (1−Dit)])|W,D]. (19)
where Di is the vector of default indicators. That is, for company i, Di = 0 before
default, and 1 when default. pY (y) represents the unconditional probability density of
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the unobservable common factor Y. Here, we assume that Y is independent of W .
The model parameters are estimated through a combination of EM algorithm and
the Gibbs sampler.
B Parameter Estimation
For estimating the default intensity parameter θ = (β, η, κ), a combination of Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm is em-
ployed. This combination has advantage for the Maximum likelihood parameter estima-
tion in the model with incomplete information. The detailed steps include
Step 1. Get the maximum likelihood estimator of the intensity model with only
observable covariates βˆ. That is the MLE from equation 18 without considering the
effect of unobservable covariate Y.
Step 2. Assign an initial estimate value for θ, as suggested by Duffie, Eckner, Horel
and Saita (2008), at θ(0) = (βˆ, 0.05, 0).
Step 3. Draw n independent sample path for the frailty factor Y (1), . . . , Y (n) from
pY (·|W,D, θl), that is the conditional density of Y’s OU process. This can be down with
MCMC, specifically Gibbs sampler, while taking the lth estimate value for θl as well as
the observable covariates W and D as given.
Step 4. Maximization step. Define the intermediate quality
Q(θ, θ(l)) = Eθ(l)(logL(θ|W,Y,D))
=
∫
logL(θ|W, y,D)pY (y|W,D, θ(l)) dy (20)
Based on the sample path for Y drawn in step 3, Q(θ, θ(l)) can be approximated by
Qˆ(θ, θ(l)) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
logL(θ|W,Y (j), D) (21)
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Then the new parameter estimate θ(l+1) can be get by
Max Qˆ(θ, θ(l)) =Max
1
n
n∑
j=1
logL(θ|W,Y (j), D) (22)
Step 5. Back to step 3, and replace θ(l) with the new estimator θ(l+1). Proceed to step
4 to get θ(l+2). Repeating step 3, 4, until the estimation of θ reasonable convergence.
The asymptotic standard errors for the parameter estimators can be calculate from
the Hessian matrix of the expected complete-data likelihood.
C Correlation Structure of Observable Factors
This appendix lists the factor time series models estimated by Duffie, Saita and Wang
(2007).
kr =
(
0.03 −0.021
− 0.027 0.034
)
, θr =
(
3.59
5.47
)
,
Cr =
(
0.5639 0
0.2247 0.2821
)
,
b = (0.0090 − 0.0121)′, kD = 0.0355, σD = 0.346
kV = 0.015, σV = 0.1169
AA′ +BB′ =
(
1 0.448
0.448 1
)
, BB′ =
(
0.448 0.0338
0.0338 0.0417
)
,
kS = 0.1137, αS = 0.047, θS = 0.1076,
γS = (0.0366 0.0134)
′.
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Figure 1: Hypothetic and filtered frailty. The solid line is the simulated hypothetic
frailty variable. The dash-dotted lines are the conditional posterior mean of the filtered latent
frailty variables given different realization of default time for each firm.
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Figure 2: Defaults and default intensities. The bars represents number of defaults
in each year. The solid and dashed lines represent the estimated default intensities aggre-
gated across firms each month with (a) dynamic-frailty model (solid line), (b) no-frailty model
(dashed line), respectively.
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Figure 3: Portfolio default rate distribution with and without frailty factor. The
conditional probability density of default rate within 5 years, for the portfolio formed by all
active firms at the 25th-year end, from (a) no-frailty model (solid line), (b) dynamic-frailty
model (dashed line). We apply Gaussian kernel smoothing (with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-
Carlo generated empirical distribution.
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Figure 4: Portfolio default rate distribution with and without Greenspan effect.
The conditional probability density of default rate within 5 years, for the portfolio formed
by all active firms at the 25th-year end, in (a) a model with positively correlated short term
interest rate and stock market performance (solid line), (b) a model without such correlation
(dashed line). We apply Gaussian kernel smoothing (with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-Carlo
generated empirical distribution.
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Figure 5: Portfolio default rate distribution with and without structural break in
the intensity parameter for distance to default. The conditional probability density of
default rate within 5 years, for the portfolio formed by all active firms at the 25th-year end, in
(a) a model with structural break in data (solid line), (b) a model without such break (dashed
line). We apply Gaussian kernel smoothing (with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-Carlo generated
empirical distribution.
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Figure 6: Filtered frailty with different lengths of available historic data. The
posterior mean of the filtered latent frailty variables conditioned on available historic data of
(a) 25 years (dotted line), (b) 10 years (dashed line), (c) 5 years (dash-dotted line). The solid
line is the simulated hypothetic frailty variable.
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Figure 7: Portfolio default rate distribution with different lengths of available
historic data. The probability density of default rate within 5 years, for the portfolio formed
by all active firms at the 25th-year end, in a frailty model conditioned on available historic
data of (a) 25 years (dashed line), (b) 10 years (dotted line), (c) 5 years (solid line). We
apply Gaussian kernel smoothing (with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-Carlo generated empirical
distribution.
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Figure 8: Portfolio default rate distribution with different economic states. The
probability density of default rate within 5 years, from the portfolio formed by all active firms at
the 25th-year end, in a frailty model conditioned on (a) a relatively good economic state (solid
line), (b) a relatively bad economic state (dashed line). We apply Gaussian kernel smoothing
(with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-Carlo generated empirical distribution.
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Figure 9: Portfolio default rate distribution with data estimation errors. The
probability density of default rate within 5 years, from the portfolio formed by all active firms
at the 25th-year end, in a frailty model conditioned on distance to default estimation errors
with (a) signal to noise ratio 5 (dotted line), (b) signal to noise ratio 10 (solid line), (c) no noise
(dashed line). We apply Gaussian kernel smoothing (with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-Carlo
generated empirical distribution.
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Figure 11: Prediction of CDO downgrading for different risk groups. This figure
presents the CDO downgrading prediction with resect to ABS CDOs in our sample for three
risk groups. The integers above the bar are the number of CDOs belonging to the relevant
risk groups.
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Figure 12: Average out-of-sample power curves for default prediction. The hori-
zontal axis denotes the riskiest x fraction of CDOs, ranked with Ri. The power curve value
for x gives the fraction of downgrades included in the riskiest x fraction. The solid line is the
curve for our benchmark frailty model and the dashed line is the best prediction in theory.
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Table I
Validation Test
This table reports the validation test of the intensity parameter estimation. The maximum and min-
imum numbers of defaults recorded are 648 and 573 respectively. RMSE denotes root mean squared
error, and E-parameter denotes mean of the estimated parameters.
True parameter E-parameter RMSE
constant -1.029 -0.990 0.201
distance to default -1.201 -1.171 0.047
trailing stock return -0.646 -0.583 0.098
3-month T-bill rate -0.255 -0.265 0.045
trailing S&P 500 return 1.556 1.540 0.255
latent-factor volatility η 0.150 0.161 0.016
latent-factor mean reversion κ 0.030 0.031 0.005
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Table II
No-frailty Model versus Dynamic-frailty Model
This table reports the frailty factor to default rate prediction. Panel A reports summary statistics for
time series of observable factors. Panel B reports the Maximum likelihood estimates of default intensity
parameters with and without frailty respectively. Panel C presents the percentiles of predicted default
distribution. Total number of firms alive at the beginning of the prediction is 2170.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Quantiles
Variable Mean Std. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
distance to default 4.70 2.46 -3.40 2.81 4.76 6.59 12.86
trailing stock return(%) 13.98 72.01 -81.70 -29.11 -1.07 37.15 317.76
3-month T-bill rate 5.11 1.56 1.62 4.01 5.10 6.03 10.52
trailing S&P 500 return(%) 10.37 13.90 -24.59 0.35 9.12 20.54 47.44
Panel B: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
With frailty Without frailty
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
constant -1.046 -5.4 -0.828 -5.1
distance to default -1.115 -31.8 -1.070 -30.3
trailing stock return -0.732 -7.2 -0.812 -7.5
3-month T-bill rate -0.253 -7.3 -0.325 -10.7
trailing S&P 500 return 1.756 5.9 1.538 5.1
latent-factor volatility η 0.147 10.3
latent-factor mean reversion κ 0.029 5.1
Panel C: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
with frailty(%) 4.61 5.81 8.48 12.86 14.29 17.33 21.01
without frailty(%) 4.06 5.16 7.47 10.69 11.66 13.41 15.55
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Table III
“Greenspan put” Effect
This table reports the Greenspan effect to default rate prediction. Panel A reports summary statistics
for time series of observable factors used for parameter estimation. Panel B reports the Maximum
likelihood estimates of default intensity parameters. Panel C presents the percentiles of predicted
default rate distribution. Total number of firms alive at the beginning of the prediction is 2150.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Quantiles
Variable Mean Std. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
distance to default 4.72 2.41 -3.27 2.92 4.78 6.54 13.68
trailing stock return(%) 15.28 71.82 -88.16 -27.78 0.12 38.47 475.37
3-month T-bill rate 5.16 1.77 0.99 3.90 5.13 6.43 9.46
trailing S&P 500 return(%) 11.21 13.37 -19.05 0.81 11.54 21.21 53.12
Panel B: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic
constant -0.998 0.176 -5.7
distance to default -1.176 0.035 -33.3
trailing stock return -0.618 0.092 -6.7
3-month T-bill rate -0.256 0.032 -8.0
trailing S&P 500 return 1.451 0.343 4.2
latent-factor volatility η 0.161 0.019 8.3
latent-factor mean reversion κ 0.027 0.005 5.5
Panel C: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
with Greenspan effect(%) 1.63 2.33 4.19 7.91 9.35 12.47 16.42
without Greenspan effect(%) 1.63 2.33 4.19 7.91 9.26 12.33 16.28
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Table IV
Structural Break in Intensity Parameter for Distance to Default
This table reports the effect of distance to default break to default rate prediction. Panel A reports
summary statistics for time series of observable factors. Panel B reports the Maximum likelihood esti-
mates of default intensity parameters. Panel C presents the percentiles of predicted default distribution.
Total number of firms alive at the beginning of the prediction is 2123.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Quantiles
Variable Mean Std. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
distance to default 4.67 2.55 -2.83 2.79 4.80 6.61 12.86
trailing stock return(%) 11.87 65.09 -78.06 -27.22 0.00 33.64 261.72
3-month T-bill rate 5.11 1.56 1.62 4.01 5.10 6.03 10.52
trailing S&P 500 return(%) 10.37 13.90 -24.59 0.35 9.12 20.54 47.44
Panel B: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic
constant -1.054 0.165 -6.4
distance to default -1.174 0.040 -29.3
trailing stock return -0.546 0.092 -5.9
3-month T-bill rate -0.257 0.032 -8.0
trailing S&P 500 return 1.665 0.281 5.9
latent-factor volatility η 0.172 0.017 10.2
latent-factor mean reversion κ 0.037 0.006 6.2
Panel C: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
with break(%) 4.00 5.13 7.63 11.73 13.05 15.78 19.08
without break(%) 4.19 5.46 8.2 12.81 14.27 17.48 21.48
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Table V
Length of Available Data
This table reports limitation in data availability to default rate prediction. Panel A reports the maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of intensity-model parameters with 25 years, 10 years, and 5 years of historical
data. Panel B reports the percentiles of predicted default distribution at year 25. Total number of firms
alive at the beginning of the prediction is 2170.
Panel A: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
25 years 10 years 5 years
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
constant -1.046 -5.4 -1.6 -6.5 0.065 0.1
distance to default -1.115 -31.8 -1.126 -24.1 -1.164 -14.9
trailing stock return -0.732 -7.2 -0.674 -5.2 -0.405 -2.3
3-month T-bill rate -0.253 -7.3 -0.149 -2.8 -0.457 -4.0
trailing S&P 500 return 1.756 5.9 1.136 2.6 0.525 0.7
latent-factor volatility η 0.147 10.3 0.204 7.0 0.074 0.8
latent-factor mean reversion κ 0.029 5.1 0.039 3.1 0.979 1.0
Panel B: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
25 years (%) 4.61 5.81 8.48 12.86 14.29 17.33 21.01
10 years (%) 4.06 5.16 7.47 10.69 11.66 13.41 15.58
5 years (%) 3.50 4.79 7.83 12.21 13.46 15.67 18.36
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Table VI
Realization of Economic States
This table reports the effect of random realization of economic states to default rate prediction. Panel
A reports the Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity-model parameters for good and bad economic
states. Panel B presents the percentiles of predicted default rate distribution. Total number of firms
alive at the beginning of the prediction is 2065 for bad economic state and 2212 for good economic
state.
Panel A: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
Good state Bad state
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
constant -1.217 -8.3 -0.749 -5.1
distance to default -1.182 -32.1 -1.118 -33.3
trailing stock return -0.612 -6.6 -0.558 -6.8
3-month T-bill rate -0.227 -9.8 -0.315 -11.4
trailing S&P 500 return 1.580 4.9 1.117 3.6
latent-factor volatility η 0.165 12.0 0.178 12.3
latent-factor mean reversion κ 0.030 7.2 0.032 7.0
Panel B: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
Good economic state(%) 1.76 2.49 4.07 7.14 8.27 10.71 14.20
Bad economic state(%) 2.57 3.54 5.76 9.83 11.23 14.43 18.50
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Table VII
Data Estimation Error
This table reports the data estimation error effect with (a) signal to noise ratio (S-to-N ratio) 10, (b)
signal to noise ratio 5. Panel A reports the Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity-model parameters.
Panel B presents the percentiles of predicted default rate distribution.
Panel A: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
S-to-N ratio 5 S-to-N ratio 10
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
constant -1.168 -5.9 -1.214 -6.4
distance to default -1.046 -30.9 -1.105 -31.6
trailing stock return -0.838 -7.8 -0.748 -7.3
3-month T-bill rate -0.241 -6.8 -0.247 -7.1
trailing S&P 500 return 1.701 5.8 1.603 5.4
latent-factor volatility η 0.149 9.6 0.149 9.8
latent-factor mean reversion κ 0.032 5.8 0.028 5.2
Panel B: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
S-to-N ratio 5(%) 4.01 5.21 7.74 12.03 13.46 16.50 19.98
S-to-N ratio 10(%) 3.69 4.79 7.19 11.34 12.76 15.71 19.35
No noise (%) 4.61 5.81 8.48 12.86 14.29 17.33 21.01
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Table VIII:
Empirical Results for Scenario Default Rate Prediction
This table reports CDOs’ weighted average rating (WAR); closing date(CDate); weighted average ma-
turity (WAM); number of obligers (N); scenario default rate(%) from (a) rating agency (SDR), (b)
no-frailty model (SDR NF), (c) dynamic-frailty model (SDR DF); Notches for AAA tranche downgrad-
ing (DG). Averages of the SDRs are provide at the bottom of the tables for each CDO type.
Panel A: CBO
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DG
Nomura 97/10 CCC 4.5 149 54.5 37.6 55.5 0
Captiva 97/12 B 3.8 46 47.4 37.0 47.6 2
CHYPS 97/12 CCC 3.8 51 67.2 43.1 64.5 19
BEA 98/05 CCC 4.1 96 58.7 45.3 63.0 19
Conseco 98/08 BBB- 4.6 124 15.8 16.1 29.0 0
BEA 98/12 CCC 4.0 50 67.3 52.0 74.8 0
CHYPS 99/01 CCC+ 3.8 60 53.3 43.2 65.0 0
Juniper 99/03 CCC+ 4.9 101 49.7 38.8 61.4 0
Federated 99/03 B+ 3.7 119 28.1 22.7 39.8 0
Emerald 99/05 BB 3.4 120 18.0 15.0 30.4 0
Cedar 99/06 B+ 3.9 136 35.2 21.3 42.9 0
KNIGHT 99/06 BB+ 3.6 135 18.8 16.5 28.9 0
Admiral 99/08 CCC 4.9 76 58.3 40.8 62.0 0
UBS B. 99/09 B- 4.7 90 43.9 32.2 57.2 0
INA 99/09 B- 4.8 88 47.1 33.0 57.5 15
Talcott N. 99/10 B- 5.2 146 42.1 32.9 59.2 0
FCIII 99/11 B 3.5 42 42.6 26.2 47.6 0
Centennial 99/12 B+ 4.4 141 36.2 21.9 38.9 0
Triton 99/12 A- 6.8 117 18.8 12.0 23.9 0
NW Inv. 99/12 B 4.9 84 46.5 29.9 48.8 0
Bingham 99/12 B+ 5.9 97 39.5 25.8 45.4 2
Inner H. 99/12 B+ 5.4 157 37.5 24.8 45.2 0
Juniper 00/04 B 5.5 107 42.0 29.0 55.9 1
Arlington 00/06 B+ 5.5 107 40.4 27.8 50.2 0
CAESAR 00/06 BB+ 1.2 14 33.1 14.3 14.3 0
Equus 00/06 B- 4.6 107 42.9 29.0 47.2 0
Wilbraham 00/07 B 5.5 101 44.7 31.7 55.3 0
JWS 00/07 B+ 5.7 118 40.7 26.3 44.9 0
Coliseum 00/07 BB+ 4.9 91 20.7 19.8 35.1 0
Madison Ave. 00/08 B+ 5.7 120 37.8 26.7 50.8 0
Nicholas-A. 00/08 B+ 5.5 65 39.8 27.7 53.8 0
Chartwell 00/09 B 5.8 88 43.1 33.0 62.8 0
Muzinich 00/10 B 5.3 99 44.1 31.3 56.7 0
Capstan 00/11 B 5.6 64 46.6 32.8 56.3 0
Magma 00/11 B 5.2 102 41.9 28.9 52.5 0
Lone Star 00/12 BBB- 5.5 106 17.2 17.9 40.3 0
PPM America 00/12 BB+ 1.7 48 22.9 12.5 21.9 0
Blue Eagle 00/12 B 3.9 20 58.0 40.0 65.0 0
Signature 5 00/12 BB- 3.4 104 41.5 17.3 35.9 0
VALEO 01/01 BB 7.3 97 29.8 26.8 51.5 0
Berkeley St. 01/03 B+ 5.8 128 38.1 28.1 58.8 0
Liberty Squ. 01/03 B+ 6.1 106 39.1 27.4 55.7 0
Phoenix 01/03 BBB- 3.3 62 15.6 14.5 25.8 2
Madison Ave. 01/03 BBB- 5.1 107 16.9 17.8 39.3 2
Hampden 01/03 BBB- 4.9 139 16.1 17.3 43.9 0
Centurion 01/03 B+ 5.4 202 35.6 25.7 58.3 0
Canyon 01/04 B 5.9 143 41.4 29.4 60.8 0
Nicholas 01/04 B+ 5.9 72 38.4 29.2 58.3 0
Mammoth 01/05 B+ 5.9 129 38.5 29.4 53.5 0
Liberty Squ. 01/05 B+ 6.2 106 38.8 27.6 50.0 0
Nova 01/05 BB+ 5.1 62 24.7 23.4 43.5 0
Valeo 01/05 BB+ 6.0 91 28.5 23.1 45.1 0
Balboa 01/06 BB+ 6.6 120 22.3 21.7 44.4 0
Clearwater 01/07 BB+ 7.1 171 23.6 24.4 45.6 2
Melchior 01/07 B+ 5.4 87 40.3 28.7 51.7 0
Concerto 01/07 B+ 6.1 97 41.3 33.0 59.3 0
Robeco 01/08 BB- 6.3 129 34.1 27.1 53.5 0
TCW 01/08 B+ 6.1 139 38.9 28.8 57.6 0
Cashel 01/11 B+ 5.5 101 38.5 29.7 50.2 0
(Continued)
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Panel A-Continued
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DG
Signature 6 01/12 B+ 5.5 115 41.5 27.2 48.1 0
Callidus 01/12 BB- 5.3 126 32.0 25.5 44.6 2
Cardinal 02/09 BBB- 5.9 71 18.7 25.4 43.5 0
Canyon 02/12 B+ 6.3 131 35.4 30.5 50.3 0
Rendite 03/05 BB+ 3.7 98 19.5 16.3 31.6 0
Prado 03/11 B- 4.7 44 57.7 40.9 62.0 0
Average 37.4 27.6 48.8
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Panel B: CLO
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DG
Aeries 99/08 B+ 4.9 212 35.1 24.1 43.4 0
Highland 99/08 B- 4.6 223 42.0 28.7 48.3 0
First D. 99/12 B 4.8 187 42.4 29.9 49.7 0
Longhorn 00/03 BB- 5.0 129 29.1 23.3 42.6 0
Addison 00/10 B+ 5.3 162 33.7 25.3 49.8 0
Sequils 01/04 B 3.4 137 41.5 23.4 45.3 0
New Alliance 01/04 B+ 5.6 158 35.5 26.6 50.0 0
TCW 01/05 BB- 5.1 107 31.0 26.2 50.5 0
COPERNICUS 01/07 B+ 5.2 62 39.3 32.3 55.6 0
LANDMARK 01/07 B 5.1 116 45.8 29.3 52.6 0
Highland 01/08 B- 4.9 179 43.9 32.4 60.9 0
Race Point 01/11 BB- 6.0 179 30.0 29.0 50.8 0
Endurance 02/02 B 4.9 154 39.0 31.0 50.5 0
Carlyle 02/04 BB- 5.5 244 31.4 25.0 42.6 0
Katonah 02/04 BB- 5.6 103 32.6 27.2 44.2 0
INTERCONTINENTAL 02/05 B+ 6.2 109 38.9 33.0 52.3 0
Centurion 02/08 B+ 5.0 277 32.4 27.8 41.6 0
Saratoga 02/09 B+ 5.4 278 36.3 28.9 47.6 0
Landmark 02/09 B+ 5.4 98 36.0 29.6 47.7 0
Castle Hill 02/09 B+ 5.3 143 33.5 28.0 48.0 0
RMF 02/10 B 7.2 94 47.0 41.5 61.2 0
Venture 02/11 BB- 5.4 155 31.8 28.4 45.2 0
Castle Hill 02/12 B+ 5.0 135 33.7 26.1 40.0 0
Gulf Stream 02/12 B+ 5.7 90 34.1 31.1 51.1 0
1888 02/12 B+ 5.4 142 40.4 32.4 50.9 0
LEOPARD 03/01 B+ 6.8 58 43.3 39.7 58.6 0
Katonah 03/02 BB- 5.2 98 32.3 28.6 43.9 0
Longhorn 03/03 BB+ 5.2 72 23.1 26.4 43.1 0
Race Point 03/04 BB- 5.5 208 32.1 27.9 46.6 0
ARES 03/05 BB- 5.2 118 30.9 28.8 48.3 0
Katonah 03/05 BB- 5.1 90 33.0 28.9 45.6 0
LCM I 03/06 BB- 5.2 97 31.6 28.9 47.4 0
Callidus 03/06 B+ 5.4 155 33.2 31.6 50.3 0
Waveland 03/06 BB 5.0 101 27.0 28.7 47.5 0
NYLIM 03/07 BB- 5.3 117 31.4 28.2 46.2 0
Castle Hill 03/08 B+ 5.2 140 34.6 27.2 45.9 0
Gulf Stream 03/08 B+ 5.4 134 35.6 30.1 48.5 0
Clydesdale 03/09 B+ 5.3 174 36.0 29.9 49.4 0
EUROCREDIT 03/09 B 7.4 70 51.1 42.9 62.9 0
Union Square 03/09 B+ 5.3 128 36.0 30.5 49.3 0
Magnetite 03/09 B+ 5.4 156 34.6 29.3 46.6 0
Ballyrock 03/11 BB 5.5 149 30.0 26.2 45.0 0
A4 03/11 CCC 3.4 68 60.8 39.7 61.0 0
Babson 03/11 B+ 5.2 205 33.3 26.3 46.9 0
Venture 03/11 B+ 5.8 186 33.7 30.1 48.2 0
Landmark 03/12 BB- 5.4 122 33.3 28.7 48.6 0
Aquilae 03/12 B+ 7.2 73 46.8 39.7 63.0 0
Navigator 03/12 B 5.4 166 43.1 33.7 55.4 0
LightPoint 04/02 B+ 4.1 142 37.7 27.5 49.3 0
Clarenville 04/02 B+ 6.1 99 41.7 36.4 59.6 0
A3 04/02 CCC 3.8 87 64.1 39.1 66.7 0
Ares 04/03 B+ 5.4 210 38.7 33.6 54.8 0
Celerity 04/03 BB- 5.5 131 33.5 30.5 49.6 0
Leopard 04/04 B+ 6.8 68 42.9 39.0 63.2 0
Northwoods 04/05 B+ 5.4 67 39.4 31.3 52.7 0
Boston Harbor 04/05 BB- 5.6 126 32.8 27.4 52.8 0
Champlain 04/05 B+ 5.6 207 37.0 29.0 51.6 0
Long Grove 04/05 B+ 4.8 198 34.1 25.8 48.3 0
CENTURION 04/05 B+ 5.2 295 32.8 25.1 45.4 0
Jubilee 04/05 B 6.6 64 52.7 42.2 65.6 0
Babson 04/06 B+ 5.5 195 33.7 28.7 53.8 0
Canyon 04/06 B+ 5.5 117 41.8 29.9 56.4 0
Petrusse 04/06 B+ 5.8 236 41.6 29.7 51.6 0
Carlyle 04/07 B+ 5.7 210 38.0 30.5 53.8 0
AMMC 04/07 B+ 5.3 137 36.4 29.2 54.5 0
Hudson 04/07 B 5.6 139 42.1 33.1 58.6 0
FIRST 04/07 BB- 5.0 123 29.3 26.8 46.3 0
WhiteHorse 04/07 B+ 5.8 119 40.1 32.8 56.3 0
Signature 04/07 B+ 5.2 83 41.5 30.1 51.8 0
Gulf Stream 04/08 B+ 5.7 156 37.1 30.1 53.9 0
(Continued)
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Panel B-Continued
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DG
Venture 04/08 B+ 5.8 234 38.1 32.1 57.7 0
Veritas 04/08 B+ 6.0 113 39.4 31.0 55.8 0
Clydesdale 04/08 B+ 5.5 245 35.5 28.9 54.3 0
Velocity 04/08 BB- 5.4 130 30.1 27.7 50.0 0
Flagship 04/08 B+ 5.3 178 37.7 31.5 53.4 0
Essex Park 04/09 B+ 5.7 141 37.8 31.2 55.0 0
KC 04/09 B+ 4.5 79 33.4 29.1 49.4 0
Navigator 04/10 B 5.5 171 43.6 34.7 60.8 0
BlackRock 04/10 B+ 5.3 315 37.1 28.3 52.5 0
Landmark 04/10 B+ 5.6 136 38.2 30.9 54.8 0
Adagio 04/10 B 7.7 70 53.3 44.3 70.1 0
NYLIM 04/10 B+ 5.4 171 39.0 32.3 56.1 0
Babson 04/10 B+ 5.3 337 37.0 30.6 52.3 0
LCM II 04/11 B+ 5.3 162 36.5 30.2 53.7 0
Hewetts Island 04/11 B+ 5.7 122 40.0 32.0 55.7 0
Wind River 04/11 B 5.3 174 40.0 33.3 59.2 0
Premium 04/11 B 5.5 132 40.0 34.1 59.0 0
Callidus 04/12 B+ 5.8 183 39.5 31.7 57.4 0
Alzette 04/12 B 6.7 263 43.5 34.6 58.9 0
First 04/12 B+ 5.2 126 35.0 29.4 54.0 0
Chatham 04/12 B+ 5.7 227 40.6 30.4 55.1 0
Whitney 04/12 B+ 6.1 151 35.0 31.1 55.1 0
Field PointI 04/12 CCC 3.5 39 73.1 46.2 69.2 0
Field PointII 04/12 CCC 3.6 39 84.0 51.3 66.9 0
Average 38.5 31.0 52.5
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Panel C: ABS
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DG
Bleecker 00/03 B- 6.83 35 57.2 45.7 71.4 15
Talon 00/04 B+ 6.92 66 44.6 34.8 56.2 7
Phoenix 00/05 BB- 7.84 47 43.5 29.8 48.9 0
Varick 00/09 BB+ 7.75 86 26.6 27.9 54.7 17
TIAA 00/12 BB+ 6.68 104 28.5 24.0 50.0 2
Independence 00/12 BBB- 8.45 83 29.2 25.3 51.8 6
Saybrook 01/02 B- 6.54 90 41.5 38.9 65.6 3
NYLIM 01/04 BBB 7.56 87 19.1 20.7 41.4 0
Independence 01/07 BBB- 8.45 102 26.5 22.5 44.4 4
Arroyo 01/08 BBB 7.69 108 23.3 20.4 40.7 0
Putnam 01/11 BBB 7.23 134 18.1 17.5 35.1 0
MADISON 01/12 BBB 6.72 95 19.7 18.2 33.7 0
Helios 01/12 BBB- 6.31 72 18.6 19.4 34.7 1
Commodore 02/02 BBB 6.38 52 20.9 17.3 30.8 0
Capital G. 02/02 BBB 7.61 85 20.5 20.6 36.5 0
Trainer 02/02 BBB- 7.71 92 25.8 21.7 39.1 0
F.A.B. 02/04 BBB- 5.91 90 23.5 21.1 34.4 0
Independence 02/05 BBB+ 7.64 87 20.0 18.4 29.9 0
TIAA 02/05 BBB 7.02 55 29.5 18.2 30.9 0
Anthracite 02/05 BB+ 7.00 40 58.3 30.0 45.0 0
Aspen 02/05 BBB- 7.00 26 32.1 26.9 42.3 0
LNR 02/07 B+ 7.00 41 87.5 41.5 58.5 0
ACA 02/07 BBB 7.33 83 22.8 20.5 34.9 0
Saybrook 02/11 BB 7.14 284 41.5 28.9 50.0 4
Charles 02/11 A- 6.87 89 18.7 16.9 29.2 10
ABS Capital 02/11 BBB+ 6.75 109 18.2 17.4 31.2 4
Anthracite 02/12 BB 6.99 44 60.0 31.8 50.0 0
Mulberry 02/12 BBB+ 7.53 111 15.7 18.0 33.3 16
Birch 02/12 BBB+ 7.00 40 23.8 22.5 35.0 0
C-BASS 02/12 BBB 6.82 47 27.1 23.4 38.3 0
CMBS 02/12 AA 7.00 29 22.4 20.7 27.6 0
Longport 03/01 BBB 7.09 155 28.1 19.4 33.5 18
Trainer 03/02 A- 7.00 77 19.6 17.8 31.2 19
Northlake 03/02 BBB+ 6.97 131 19.6 16.0 29.8 14
C-BASS 03/04 BBB+ 7.00 56 20.0 17.9 32.1 0
TIAA 03/05 BBB+ 7.04 87 21.6 19.5 34.5 4
Faxtor 03/05 BBB 6.90 91 21.2 18.7 33.0 0
ACA 03/05 A- 7.02 100 18.3 16.0 29.0 19
Independence 03/06 A- 7.04 115 20.2 17.4 32.2 19
Mulberry 03/06 BBB+ 6.95 112 17.0 17.9 33.9 18
LNR 03/07 B+ 7.00 51 84.1 39.2 58.8 0
C-BASS 03/07 BBB 6.94 87 21.8 20.7 35.7 0
FAB 03/07 BBB 5.99 89 21.2 18.0 33.7 0
N-Star 03/08 BBB 6.94 69 30.5 20.3 34.8 0
Coronado 03/09 A 7.01 132 12.3 14.4 26.5 0
Putnam 03/10 A 9.02 207 12.0 16.9 32.9 0
Saturn 03/10 BBB- 7.21 82 41.5 25.6 42.7 0
ACA 03/11 A- 6.97 138 18.3 15.2 29.0 19
TIAA 03/11 BBB 7.01 73 30.3 19.2 37.0 0
C-BASS 03/11 BBB+ 6.98 66 21.2 19.7 35.0 0
Lakeside 03/12 AA 10.55 89 15.9 16.9 32.6 0
BLUE BELL 03/12 AAA 6.75 137 6.6 9.5 19.0 8
Commodore 03/12 A- 7.03 91 19.5 17.6 34.1 13
Trainer 04/01 AA- 6.90 95 15.1 14.7 28.4 0
Independence 04/02 A- 6.94 155 20.4 14.8 30.3 19
Alexander 04/02 A 7.00 127 17.1 15.7 30.7 9
Knollwood 04/03 A+ 6.91 160 16.4 13.8 28.8 19
C-Bass 04/03 BBB 6.97 66 25.0 22.7 42.4 0
Newcastle 04/03 BBB- 6.99 58 31.6 25.9 43.1 0
Anthracite 04/03 BB+ 7.00 58 52.2 28.8 48.3 0
Lakeside 04/03 AA+ 9.09 145 11.7 14.5 29.7 0
FAB 04/04 BBB+ 7.48 62 17.8 21.0 37.1 0
Vermeer 04/04 BBB+ 7.02 83 20.9 19.3 34.9 0
Bluegrass 04/04 A 6.87 112 18.4 14.3 29.0 18
Klio 04/04 AAA 6.43 160 7.6 9.1 20.0 4
Saturn 04/04 A 7.25 107 19.5 15.9 30.8 0
Saturn 04/04 BBB- 7.20 89 41.5 25.8 48.3 3
FAXTOR 04/05 BBB 6.85 92 22.0 18.5 37.0 0
C-Bass 04/05 BBB- 6.87 98 32.9 25.5 44.4 0
ACA 04/05 A- 6.98 102 19.4 15.7 30.4 0
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Panel C-Continued
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DG
Rhodium 04/05 BBB 6.78 66 18.8 19.7 36.4 0
Sandstone 04/06 A- 7.00 55 27.2 18.2 32.7 0
Whately 04/06 A 6.88 184 14.5 13.0 28.8 17
RFC 04/06 BBB+ 6.97 93 20.4 16.1 33.3 0
N-Star 04/07 BBB 6.94 82 30.3 19.6 40.2 0
Acacia 04/07 BBB 6.93 95 23.2 17.9 36.8 0
Cascade 04/07 AA+ 8.08 107 11.3 12.1 25.2 18
C-Bass 04/09 BBB 6.83 107 25.7 21.5 38.3 0
Bluegrass 04/09 BBB+ 6.88 113 19.6 16.8 32.7 17
Newcastle 04/09 BBB- 6.75 63 26.5 23.8 39.7 0
Inman 04/10 BBB- 7.34 81 41.8 23.5 43.2 0
Klio 04/10 AA- 7.56 113 8.6 14.2 29.2 8
Pinnacle 04/10 BBB+ 6.57 160 13.8 15.1 31.9 18
Sherwood 04/10 B+ 7.31 198 41.5 36.4 61.7 19
Porter 04/10 BB 6.47 78 47.3 29.5 51.9 0
Laguna 04/10 AA+ 7.96 218 10.7 11.5 26.4 0
Reservoir 04/10 BBB- 7.08 99 19.3 25.3 47.5 14
Acacia 04/11 BBB+ 6.95 83 22.6 18.1 36.1 0
Whitehawk 04/11 A- 6.42 95 10.6 15.8 29.5 1
Hillcrest 04/11 BBB- 6.95 129 29.8 24.8 45.0 10
Trainer 04/11 A+ 6.95 109 17.2 14.7 31.2 3
Jupiter 04/12 BBB+ 6.98 106 11.5 18.9 37.7 2
C-Bass 04/12 A- 6.90 70 21.0 18.6 35.7 0
McKinley 04/12 AA+ 7.16 104 8.1 10.6 23.1 19
Revelstoke 04/12 AAA 6.08 72 6.5 9.7 19.4 5
Cimarron 04/12 AAA 6.98 93 6.9 9.7 21.6 3
Belle 04/12 AA 9.18 190 13.4 14.2 30.0 17
Vermeer 04/12 A- 7.06 106 18.8 15.1 32.1 0
Witherspoon 04/12 AA+ 6.85 154 8.6 11.0 23.1 0
Fairfield 04/12 BB 6.99 75 49.1 29.3 51.6 0
Margate 04/12 AA 6.82 229 10.1 10.9 25.3 4
Zenith 04/12 AA- 6.86 146 9.7 12.3 27.4 15
Ischus 04/12 A 6.96 107 21.3 15.0 31.8 0
Average 24.7 20.1 36.7
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Panel D: CDO2
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DG
Coast 00/10 B+ 6.4 70 75.3 32.9 57.1 0
Centurion 01/03 B- 6.7 151 69.0 35.1 65.1 0
Coast 01/08 BB- 6.7 66 68.6 30.8 56.5 0
Lafayette Sovereign 02/04 BB+ 3.8 30 32.1 23.3 33.3 0
Lynx 02/05 BB 7.7 34 44.8 35.3 52.9 0
Zais 02/12 BBB- 7.0 49 47.4 24.5 40.8 0
Connecticut Valley 03/05 BBB 6.8 72 31.9 19.4 34.7 0
Porter Square 03/07 BB- 7.0 55 34.6 40.0 56.4 0
Vertical 03/10 A- 3.7 61 10.1 9.8 18.0 0
Tricadia 04/01 BBB- 6.6 69 36.3 21.9 39.1 0
Zais 04/01 BBB- 5.7 67 42.6 22.4 40.3 0
Vertical 04/03 AA 9.8 71 10.8 18.3 35.2 0
Tricadia 04/11 BB+ 7.5 62 55.3 30.6 56.5 0
TABS 04/12 AA+ 7.6 98 9.7 12.2 27.0 18
Lusitano 01/08 BBB- 3.2 72 21.0 12.5 20.8 0
Pro Rata 03/09 B+ 3.9 104 38.2 26.0 42.3 0
Hamilton 03/09 B+ 5.0 158 34.6 31.0 48.7 19
Average 38.9 25.1 42.6
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